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The paper studies the questions of why and when a supply chain should invest in a traceability system
that allows the identiﬁcation of which supplier is responsible for quality defects due to insufﬁcient non-
contractible effort. We consider an environment with complementarity in upstream and downstream
efforts to provide quality, imperfect, lagged signals of intermediate and ﬁnal quality, and repeated in-
teraction. It is demonstrated that in deciding whether to maintain information about product origin,
ﬁrms face a trade-off. On one hand, the downstream ﬁrm is tempted to condone limited upstream
shirking when products are not traceable to their ﬁrm of origin. On the other hand, the downstream ﬁrm
is tempted to vertically coordinate shirking in the provision of quality when products are traceable.
Perfect traceability is not optimal if (1) the ratio of the cost savings from upstream and downstream
shirking is neither too high nor too low or (2) the downstream ﬁrm sufﬁciently infrequently detects input
defects or (3) the consumer experience is a sufﬁciently noisy signal of quality.
& 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1 Upstream and downstream efforts can also be “vertically substitutable” or
“horizontally complementary”. For example, vertical substitutability arises if an
upstream party can exert effort such as sanitation to prevent microbial con-
tamination and a downstream party can exert an effort such as irradiation or
pasteurization treatment to reduce it (Roe, 2004). Inputs can be horizontally1. Introduction
In 2002, the European Union adopted legislation requiring all food
to be traceable to its origins of production, and the United States and
several other countries are considering the adoption of similar leg-
islation (European Union, 2002; Food and Drug Administration,
2012). The rationale for mandatory traceability is that it enables
timely identiﬁcation of the source of contamination or defects in
supply chains where inputs from different suppliers are commingled
during the processing stage (Roth et al., 2008; Trienekens and
Zuurbier, 2008). Traceability can also be seen as a tool to maintain
trust within a supply chain and build a reputation for producing high
quality products when ﬁrms' behavior is not perfectly observed by
consumers (Marucheck et al., 2011). As discussed in Golan et al.
(2004), traceability systems in agro-food industries collect informa-
tion about the origin of the inputs and the processing history, and
vary in the number of product attributes (breadth) and production
stages (depth) covered by the system as well as the accuracy of in-
formation about product movement and origin. Charlier and Val-
ceschini (2008) pointed out that informational requirements under
mandatory traceability may not be sufﬁciently stringent to allow a
complete tracing of a given unit of a ﬁnal product to its suppliers of
origin. Here we study the decision to adopt a traceability system that
provides information about product movement in the presence of
moral hazard at the upstream and downstream stages of production
and reputational effects.td. This is an open access article uWe consider a two-stage supply chain with anonymous, ver-
tically complementary, experience inputs such that (a) the iden-
tity of the upstream supplier of a given product is unknown,
(b) the ﬁnal quality is low if quality at any stage of production is
low, and (c) both intermediate and ﬁnal product qualities are
unveriﬁable and imperfectly observed after consumption (Buhr,
2003; Gibbons, 2005; Skilton and Robinson, 2009).1 For ex-
ample, in meat supply chains processors source live animals
from multiple producers and some quality attributes such as
taste and texture are discovered after the identity of supplier
has been separated from the meat cut. Meat quality is inﬂu-
enced by on-farm and off-farm practices such as genetic
screening and feeding of animals, sanitation, veterinary care,
and handling during transportation, slaughter, and storage
(Dahl et al., 2004; Koohmaraie et al., 2005). Another example is
a fresh produce supply chain where shipments from multiple
growers are mixed during post-harvest processing, and quality
attributes such as shelf life and internal defects are only re-
vealed over time. High quality produce requires investments in
appropriate farming practices by growers and investment innder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
complementary in determining quality attributes if low quality inputs from one
supplier increase the likelihood that the quality of products that originate from
other suppliers is also low.
3 The effects of traceability are also studied in a model of collective reputation
with network monitoring in Saak (2012). While Saak focuses on the role of “hor-
izontal” peer monitoring, we consider a supply chain in which the upstream ﬁrms
do not observe one another's effort choices and study the effects of traceability on
the vertical relationship between upstream and downstream ﬁrms. There are many
empirical studies of the determinants of adoption and effects of traceability in
supply chains (Resende-Filho and Buhr, 2008; Banterle and Stranieri, 2008; Pouliot,
2011; Galliano and Orozco, 2011, Liao et al., 2011, and Heyder et al., 2012).
4 Charlier and Valceschini (2008) examine the effects of mandatory traceability
established under European regulation and the role of coordination and leadership
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(Blackburn, Scudder, 2009; Hardesty and Kusunose, 2009).
To evaluate the value of information about input origin, we
combine the static model of quality leadership in a supply chain
with complementary inputs of Hennessy et al. (2001) and the
dynamic model of ﬁrm reputation with imperfect monitoring of
Cai and Obara (2009). In the environment studied in this paper,
ﬁrms along the supply chain will shirk in the provision of quality
to save costs unless they are sufﬁciently patient to build reputation
of high quality. As in the case of reputation of a single ﬁrm, in our
setting with vertically related ﬁrms customer trust is maintained
in equilibrium because bad performances in the ﬁnal good market
are followed by a punishment phase during which the price is
reduced or ﬁnancial penalties are paid (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis,
2008).2
The key feature of our model is that information about input
origin has both positive and negative effects on reputation building.
On the one hand, traceability allows to base input payments on
individual rather than group performance. On the other hand,
traceability allows matching the levels of upstream and down-
stream efforts put into products. This makes it possible to vertically
coordinate downstream and upstream shirking with a subset of
suppliers. Whether the adoption of a traceability system is optimal
in equilibrium is determined by comparing the strengths of the
temptation to engage in vertically coordinated “top down” shirking
and the temptation to condone occasional anonymous “bottom up”
shirking. We ﬁnd that perfect traceability is not optimal in a
supply chain if one or more of the following conditions hold:
(1) the ratio of the cost savings from upstream and downstream
shirking is neither too high nor too low, (2) the downstream ﬁrm
not too often detects input defects, (3) the consumer experience is
a sufﬁciently noisy signal of quality.
If the ratio of the upstream and downstream costs of provision
of high quality is either very small or very large, consumers need
to punish the downstream ﬁrm for bad performance in the ﬁnal
good market less harshly under traceability. This happens because
the downstream ﬁrm has little to gain from vertically coordinated
deviations relative to vertically uncoordinated deviations, but it is
able to punish shirkers individually. However, if the cost savings
from upstream and downstream shirking on efforts to provide
quality are similar, supplier anonymity raises proﬁts because the
equilibrium temptation to vertically coordinate shirking is stron-
ger than the temptation to tolerate a few anonymous low quality
inputs.
The intuition behind the effect of more precise consumer
monitoring of upstream and downstream efforts on the value of
traceability is also interesting. When the signals of ﬁnal quality are
imprecise, the supply chain has little reputational capital at stake.
As a result, supplier anonymity is optimal because no additional
punishment in the ﬁnal good market is necessary to make the
downstream ﬁrm's promise to punish all suppliers for anonymous
shirking credible. However, if the signal of ﬁnal quality is precise,
good reputation is very valuable. Then the promise to punish all
suppliers for occasional anonymous shirking will not be credible
without more severe punishments in the ﬁnal good market than
those that are necessary to assure that the downstream ﬁrm re-
strains itself from vertically coordinated shirking.
Most of the previous economics literature on traceability stu-
dies the effects of traceability on the choices of efforts to provide2 Although in equilibrium consumers sometimes punish the downstream ﬁrm,
they do not make any statistical inferences about the upstream and downstream
efforts because there is no shirking on the equilibrium path. Some authors (e.g.,
Cabral (2009)) use the word “trust” to describe an equilibrium of the repeated game
where the public history of the game is encapsulated in the consumers' belief about
the ﬁrm's trustworthiness.safe food.3 Pouliot and Sumner (2008) show that an exogenous
increase in traceability has a positive effect on food safety in a
supply chain with farms, marketers, and consumers by increasing
liability costs for defective products. In Pouliot and Sumner (2012),
farms market food over two periods and traceability enables a
targeted removal of unsafe food from the market in the second
period. They ﬁnd that the effects of traceability on the proﬁt-
maximizing levels of food safety for individual farms and the in-
dustry acting as a group depend on the relative strengths of the
quantity and conﬁdence effects of safety failures on demand. Re-
sende-Filho and Hurley (2012) demonstrate that the principal
chooses the lowest level of costly traceability precision in a static
principal-agent setting with risk neutral agents. In this paper we
focus on the decision to adopt a traceability system in an en-
vironment where the effects of consumer information about pro-
duct quality on prices and future demand are derived rather than
assumed.4
Investment in product quality under formal contractual ar-
rangements between suppliers and manufacturers is studied in
operations management literature. Baiman et al. (2000) and Lim
(2001) consider contract design in static settings with one supplier
and one manufacturer. Baiman et al. (2004) and Li et al. (2011)
study quality investments in a supply chain where one manu-
facturer contracts with multiple suppliers and defective compo-
nents cause the failure of the whole product (the “weakest-link”
property). In their settings, the manufacturer makes a single pro-
duct and does not observe whether individual components are
defective without testing. DeYong and Pun (2015) examine sup-
pliers' dishonest behavior in a multi-tiered supply chain with en-
dogenous investments in production technology and inspections,
and show that the buyer can beneﬁt from a high rework cost or
when the suppliers' penalties for cheating are low. Here we con-
sider a multi-product environment with the “weakest-link” prop-
erty and assume that downstream ﬁrm privately learns the qua-
lities of intermediate products (whether individual components
are defective) after processing has begun and the identity of the
supplier has been separated from the product.
More generally, our paper is related to the literature on repeated
games with imperfect monitoring concerned with the role of in-
formation structures. In particular, Kandori (1992) shows that in
repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, the set of equili-
brium payoffs expands when signals become more informative. In
contrast, in our setting with private inter-ﬁrm monitoring of input
quality, the set of equilibrium payoffs may expand when signals of
product origin are garbled. Fong and Li (2010) show that inter-
temporal garbling of public signals can increase the efﬁciency of re-
lational contracting by reducing temptations to renege. We consider
garbling of private information about the sources of inputs within
periods, which reduces temptations to shirk as well as renege.by downstream ﬁrms in creating industry-wide incentives to adopt a more strin-
gent traceability system. A model of voluntary adoption of traceability in supply
chains with network effects is also studied in Souza-Monteiro and Caswell (2010).
Epelbaum and Martinez (2014) consider the impacts of the technological evolution
of food traceability systems in a framework based on the Resource Based View of
the ﬁrm. Dai et al. (2015) propose a design method for supply chain traceability
systems that minimizes system-wide costs and takes into account participation
incentives of individual chain parties.
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of external instruments such as explicit contracting in Baker et al.
(1994), ownership structure in Rayo (2007), ﬁrm size in Cai and
Obara (2009), and job design in Mukherjee and Vasconcelos (2011)
in sustaining relational contracts and reputation mechanisms. In
our paper, information about product ﬂows is an external instru-
ment that affects not only relational contracting between ﬁrms but
also the reputation mechanism in the ﬁnal good market. In this
way, our paper contributes to the literature on optimal contracts in
teams since in our model, the principal (downstream ﬁrm) cares
about the workers' (upstream ﬁrms') efforts only because con-
sumers do so (e.g., Che and Yoo (2001)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
present the basic model with two suppliers. In Section 3, we char-
acterize equilibrium with and without traceability. In Section 4, we
compare proﬁts in the traceability and the no-traceability regime.
Section 5 considers some extensions and robustness checks: allowing
for multiple suppliers, turnover among suppliers, contingent up-
stream contracts, imperfect detection of input defects, and sub-
stitutable upstream and downstream efforts. Section 6 concludes.2. Model
We consider a supply chain with two identical upstream ﬁrms,
A and B, and a downstream ﬁrm, D. All ﬁrms are risk-neutral and
long-lived with the outside options normalized to zero. Time is
discrete and is indexed by t; let δ ∈ ( )0, 1 denote the common
discount factor. In each period, each supplier produces either one
unit or none of a homogeneous intermediate good and sells it to
the downstream ﬁrm. The downstream ﬁrm transforms the in-
termediate good into the ﬁnal good on a one-to-one basis and sells
at most two units in the ﬁnal good market. In each period upon
delivery supplier j's input is randomly assigned a serial number
∈ { }i 1, 2 : {( ) = ( )} = {( ) = ( )} =o o A B o o B APr , , Pr , ,1 2 1 2
1
2
, where
∈ { }o A B,i is the upstream ﬁrm of origin of input i. Table 1 lists the
notations used in this paper.
In each period supplier j chooses the level of effort ∈ { }e 0, 1ju
at cost c eu j
u, where >c 0u . The effort of supplier oi determines theTable 1
Table of notation.
Parameters and exogenous variables
δ Discount factor
α Probability of high public signal when ﬁnal quality is high
β Probability of high public signal when ﬁnal quality is low
cd Cost of downstream effort
cu Cost of upstream effort
x =c c/u d
oi Supplier of origin of input i
y Public average signal of quality
k Traceability regime (N or T)
Decision and endogenous variables
ej
u Effort chosen by supplier j
ei
d Unit i-speciﬁc effort chosen by the downstream ﬁrm
qi
u Intermediate quality of input i
qi Final quality of unit i
wj Input price offer to supplier j
wk Input price policy in regime k
( )p yk Price policy
Pk Expected price
Objective functions
πjk Per product player j 's payoff in regime k
πk Per product joint proﬁt in regime kquality of intermediate product i, =q ei
u
o
u
t
. The downstream ﬁrm
chooses the level of effort ∈ { }e 0, 1id at cost c ed id for each unit i,
where >c 0d . Let ≡x c c/u d denote the ratio of the costs of up-
stream and downstream efforts. The ﬁnal quality of unit i is high
only if the upstream ﬁrm and downstream ﬁrm put in efforts,
= ∈ { }q q e 0, 1i i
u
i
d . For example, producing high quality meat pro-
ducts requires investments in stress prevention in animals by
growers and protection of quality during processing and dis-
tribution by packers.
On the demand side of the market, there is a large number of
risk-neutral consumers. It will be convenient to refer to the mass
of consumers as a single player C. If the consumers buy product i,
the (monetized) consumers' beneﬁt is + ( − )vq v q1i i , where
− − > ≥v c c v0u d , that is, trade is efﬁcient only if upstream and
downstream ﬁrms put in efforts.5 Our focus is on hidden quality
attributes such as pesticide residues or internal damages that pose
little risk of cross contamination to other products or other con-
sumers. We also assume that traceability does not directly affect
the costs of efforts and consumption values (Menard and Val-
ceschini, 2005).
After purchasing customers imperfectly observe a noisy signal
of quality for each unit i, ∈ { }Y 0, 1i , that is drawn from the fol-
lowing distribution: α( = | = ) =Y qPr 1 1i i and β( = | = ) =Y qPr 1 0i i ,
where β α≤ < <0 1, that is, higher quality is more likely to gen-
erate a higher signal, and Yi are independent across products and
across periods conditional on qi. Let = ( + )Y Y Y
1
2 1 2
denote the
average public signal of ﬁnal quality, and let ∈ { }y 0, 0.5, 1 denote
its particular realization.
The timing of events in each period t is as follows:
1. The downstream ﬁrm offers each supplier j a contract that
speciﬁes a transfer (input price) wj. Then each supplier either ac-
cepts it and privately chooses its level of effort ej
u or gets the
outside option. The participation decisions are public information,
but input price wj is only observed by supplier j.
6
2. In the traceability regime, input/product origins, ( )o o,1 2 , are
revealed. In the no-traceability regime, input/product origins are
unknown.
3. The downstream ﬁrm privately chooses the input-speciﬁc
efforts ( )e e,d d1 2 and privately observes the input quality proﬁle,
( )q q,u u1 2 .
4. The downstream ﬁrm sets the ﬁnal good prices for the per-
iod, ( ) ∈ +p p,1 2
2R , and consumers decide whether to purchase the
ﬁnal products, ( ) ∈ { }b b, 0, 11 2 2.
5. If the consumers purchase the ﬁnal products, signals of ﬁnal
quality, ( )Y Y,1 2 , are publicly observed.
The assumptions that the supply chain relies on reputational
contracting rather than relational contingent contracting and that
output prices cannot be negative simplify the exposition but are
not essential for the analysis to follow (see Footnote 8). Upstream
contracts with transfers contingent on the observations of ﬁnal
quality or retail prices are rare, and suppliers may not have de-
tailed information about demand and sales in geographically dis-
tant downstream markets (Hueth et al., 1999; Gulati et al., 2007).
In Section 4, we discuss when the downstream ﬁrm can achieve
higher proﬁts by offering upstream contracts contingent on the5 Since consumers' valuations are taken to be constant over time, we rule out
spillovers due to consumption of low quality that could arise when unsafe food
damages consumer health and undermines future demand. However, our results
will continue to hold qualitatively if consumption of low quality exogenously re-
duces future demand. In fact, equilibrium purchasing behavior after consumers
have a “bad” experience with the product is consistent with a model where con-
sumption of low quality reduces willingness to pay in the future.
6 Since the supplier base is ﬁxed and suppliers are capacity constrained, cutting
suppliers off will reduce the quantity of output.
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results. We also assume that (a) the downstream ﬁrm offers a
contract to each supplier in secret and (b) chooses its own effort
levels before it observes upstream effort/input quality.7 The as-
sumption that contracts between the downstream ﬁrm and sup-
pliers are not observable to third parties is a plausible character-
ization of contracting in food supply chains (Hueth et al., 1999). For
example, contracts may include conﬁdentiality clauses or pro-
curement speciﬁcations that are difﬁcult for third parties to eval-
uate. A justiﬁcation for the timing of downstream effort decisions
and arrival of information about input quality is that provision of
high quality may require planning or capital expenditures such as
maintaining equipment or personnel training (DeYong and Pun,
2015).
Assuming that both suppliers are employed by the downstream
ﬁrm, starting from the beginning of period t the respective per
product payoffs for each supplier ∈ { }j A B, , the downstream ﬁrm,
D, and consumers, C, are given by
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥∑π δ= ( − )τ
τ
τ τ
≥
−E w c e ,j
t
t
j
u
j
u
, ,
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥∑ ∑ ∑π δ= − −
τ
τ
τ τ τ τ
≥
−
∈{ } ∈{ }
E b p c e w ,D
t
t
i
i i
d
i
d
j A B
j
1
2
1,2
, , ,
,
,
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥∑ ∑π δ= ( + ( − ) − )τ
τ
τ τ τ τ
≥
−
∈{ }
E b vq v q p1 ,C
t
t
i
i i i i
1
2
1,2
, , , ,
and the per product joint payoff of the upstream ﬁrms and the
downstream ﬁrm is given by
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥∑ ∑ ∑π δ= − −
τ
τ
τ τ τ τ
≥
−
∈{ } ∈{ }
E b p c e c e .
t
t
i
i i
d
i
d
j A B
u
j
u1
2
1,2
, , ,
,
,
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in this model consists of
(a) the downstream ﬁrm's input and output pricing and effort
strategy, upstream ﬁrms’ participation and effort strategies, and
consumers' purchasing strategy that prescribe actions for all pos-
sible outcomes, and (b) beliefs of all players such that simulta-
neously (i) none of the players can increase her expected payoff by
unilaterally deviating from the planned action, and (ii) all players
update their beliefs using the Bayes rule whenever possible. As
usual, there are many PBE in this repeated game, including the
repetition of the unique static equilibrium of the stage game in
every period where there is no trade since all ﬁrms choose low
quality.
We will study the decision to adopt the traceability system by
comparing equilibria that yield the greatest proﬁt for the down-
stream ﬁrm in the traceability and no-traceability regime. For
concreteness, we assume that the downstream ﬁrm can extract
future rents from the upstream ﬁrms in the beginning of the game
(there are many potential suppliers who bid for the opportunity to7 A plausible alternative characterization of the contracting environment and
technology is that contracts between the downstream ﬁrm and suppliers are ob-
served publicly (by other suppliers and possibly consumers) or that the down-
stream ﬁrm chooses its own efforts after observing the upstream effort/input
quality. In either case, traceability does not expand the room for sophisticated
deviations, and therefore, cannot have a negative effect on reputation building. The
reason is that, when input prices are public, the downstream ﬁrm cannot covertly
procure a mix of low and high quality inputs. On the other hand, if there is no lag in
detecting input quality, information about the supplier's identity is not necessary to
match low (high) upstream efforts with low (high) downstream efforts.supply the downstream ﬁrm), so that the downstream ﬁrm
chooses the regime that maximizes the joint proﬁt. We will use
superscript ∈ { }k T N, to denote the traceability and no-trace-
ability regime, respectively. Since we will focus on stationary
equilibria, in what follows the time subscript will be dropped.3. Equilibrium
We refer to the current consumer willingness to pay that is con-
tingent on the history of public signals of quality as the reputation of
the downstream ﬁrm. As in Cai and Obara (2009), we focus on
equilibrium where consumers purchase as long as the downstream
ﬁrm adheres to some price policy ( )p yk for each unit, where y is the
public average signal in the previous period. We can restrict our at-
tention to uniform (across units) prices because for any price policy
that depends on the unit-speciﬁc public signals of ﬁnal quality there
exists an equivalent price policy that depends on the average signal.
Allowing ﬁnal prices to vary across units cannot increase proﬁts be-
cause, as each upstream ﬁrm is equally likely to supply the inter-
mediate good that is transformed into unit i, y is a sufﬁcient statistic
for ( )y y,1 2 with respect to ﬁnal quality proﬁle (q ,1 )q2 .
In equilibrium in both regimes each supplier and the down-
stream ﬁrm exert high efforts, and the downstream ﬁrm offers the
expected input payment wk to each supplier as long as input
quality remains high. However, the downstream ﬁrm reacts dif-
ferently to upstream shirking in the regime with and without
traceability. In the traceability regime, the downstream ﬁrm
punishes suppliers individually. In the no-traceability regime the
downstream ﬁrm punishes all suppliers whether one or both of
them shirk. The downstream ﬁrm can punish upstream shirking
(i) by excluding suppliers from all future transactions (“cutting
suppliers off”), or (ii) by procuring low quality inputs forever (Nash
reversion in the supplier-downstream ﬁrm subgame). In each case,
during the upstream punishment phase suppliers get their re-
servation utilities. An important difference between the punish-
ments by (i) supplier exclusion (low quantity) and (ii) Nash re-
version (low quality), is that consumers perfectly observe the
former but imperfectly observe the latter. We will show that in
equilibrium it is optimal for the downstream ﬁrm to promise to
punish upstream shirking by covert, inﬁnite Nash reversion (low
quality) in upstream transactions with certain suppliers.
It will be convenient to let
∑( ) = ( ) ( = | = = )∈{ }P e e e e p y Y y q e e q e e, , , Pr ,T Au Bu d d y T Au d Bu d1 2 0,0.5,1 1 1 2 2
and
⎡
⎣⎢
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎤
⎦⎥( ) = ∑ ( ) = + =∈{ }P e e e e p y Y y e e e e Y y e e e e, , , Pr , Pr ,
N
A
u
B
u d d
y
N
A
u d
B
u d
B
u d
A
u d
1 2 0,0.5,1
1
2 1 2
1
2 1 2
.
( )P e e e e, , ,T Au Bu d d1 2 is the expected (before the public signals
of ﬁnal quality are realized) price when the downstream ﬁrm
knows the level of effort for each supplier and the supplier
of origin for each unit, where for concreteness it is assumed that
unit 1 (respectively, 2) originates from supplier A (respectively, B).
( )P e e e e, , ,N Au Bu d d1 2 is the expected price when the downstream ﬁrm
knows the level of effort for each supplier but does not know
which unit originates from which supplier.
Next we will establish when there exist wk and pk such that the
proposed strategies constitute an equilibriumwhere all ﬁrms exert
efforts in every period.
3.1. Upstream incentive compatibility
If the downstream ﬁrm maintains a reputation for offering the
expected input payment wk and upstream ﬁrms maintain a
8 Also, note that the optimal input payment wT is the smallest input price that
satisﬁes the UIC constraint. The necessary incentive costs (that is, the price dis-
counts in the downstream market) will be the same in a model with relational
contingent contracting where the downstream ﬁrm pays out a non-contractible
bonus that equals the cost savings from upstream shirking, cu, in the end of the
period rather than δ c
u1 in the beginning of the period, because the savings from
reneging on input payment will then accrue one period before upstream shirking
begins.
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payoff of upstream ﬁrm j satisﬁes the following value recursive
equation
π δπ= − + ∈ { } ( )w c j A B, , . 1jk k u jk
Eq. (1) says that the equilibrium upstream ﬁrm's value is the
sum of the current proﬁt, −w ck u, plus the discounted continua-
tion value, δπjk. Upstream ﬁrm j is willing to accept a contract and
exert high effort if, respectively,
π ≥ ( )0 UPjk
and
π ≥ ( )w . UICjk k
The right-hand sides of the upstream ﬁrm's participation (UP)
and incentive compatibility (UIC) constraints are the upstream
ﬁrm's payoffs, respectively, from rejecting a contract or accepting
it and choosing a low level of effort in accordance with the pro-
posed downstream ﬁrm's input payment strategy (under which a
shirker is offered zero transfers in the future).
3.2. Downstream incentive compatibility
For a given effort proﬁle ( )e e e e, , ,Au Bu d d1 2 in the previous period,
the expected (before the public signals of quality in the previous
period are realized) equilibrium payoff of the downstream ﬁrm
satisﬁes the following value recursive equation
⎡
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where ≥1a b is an indicator function that equals one if ≥a b and
zero if otherwise. The right-hand side is the expected current
period proﬁt plus the ﬁrm's discounted future value provided that
suppliers adhere to the proposed participation and effort strate-
gies. That is, when offering input payments the downstream ﬁrm
takes into account that supplier j will accept only if ≥w 0j , and he
will put in effort only if the downstream ﬁrm continues to offer
≥w wj k. The downstream ﬁrm is willing to offer the expected in-
put payments and put in its own efforts if shirking does not
generate a greater payoff, that is,
⎡
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for all ∈ { } ≥y w w0, 0.5, 1 , , 0A B , ∈ { }e e, 0, 1d d1 2 .
It remains to determine under what conditions the down-
stream ﬁrm's threat to punish upstream shirking is credible. In
equilibrium the downstream ﬁrm believes that an upstream ﬁrm
that shirked at any time in the past continues to shirk forever
independently of the subsequent history of play. A novel feature of
the moral hazard problem in our setting is that the punishment of
upstream shirking by the downstream ﬁrm may not be incentive
compatible since consumer monitoring of the ﬁnal quality is im-
perfect. Because the incentive cost of maintaining credibility ofinter-ﬁrm punishments depends on whether the downstream ﬁrm
knows the identities of upstream shirkers, we will analyze inter-
ﬁrm punishments separately in the traceability and no-traceability
regime.
3.3. Traceability regime
In the traceability regime, the downstream ﬁrm's promise to
punish upstream shirking is credible because offering a zero input
payment to an identiﬁed upstream shirker is the best response.
Proposition 1. (Traceability) If > α β α
+
( − )( − )v
c c
2 1
d u
, there exists
a threshold level of the discount factor δ < 1T such that for all δ δ≥ T
an equilibrium with trade exists and the optimal input and output
price policies are given by δ=w c /T u , ( ) = − δδ α β α
+
( − )( − )p v0
T c c/
2 1
u d
,
( ) = ( ) =p p v0.5 1T T . The expected per product joint proﬁt,
π = [ − − −δ− v c c
T u d1
1
α( − ) ]δδ α β
+
( − )1
c c/
2
u d
, is increasing in δ , α, and v, and
is decreasing in β , cu, and cd.
Proof. See Appendix.
The analytical expression for δT is provided in the proof of
Proposition 1. The optimal product-pricing scheme ( )p yT pre-
scribes reducing the price only if consumers observe =y 0 in the
previous period. This punishment leaves the downstream ﬁrm just
indifferent between staying on the equilibrium path and engaging
in the most proﬁtable deviation which is to vertically coordinate
upstream and downstream shirking for a single unit. The equili-
brium price discount for bad performance in the ﬁnal good market
equals the ratio of the downstream ﬁrm's per-product cost savings
from coordinated shirking, δ( + )c c0.5 /u d , and the discounted in-
cremental probability that consumers observe the worst possible
performance, δ β α α[( − )( − ) − ( − ) ]1 1 1 2 δ α β α= ( − )( − )1 . At opti-
mum, the downstream ﬁrm is indifferent between giving up
− ( )v p 0T in the next period with probability α( − )1 2 and losing, on
average,
( )δ α( − ) [ − ( )] = +αα β δ−−v p c c1 0 ,T u d2 12 1 1
and giving up − ( )v p 0T with probability α β( − )( − )1 1 but saving
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟+δ c c
u d1
2
1 in the current period:
( ) ( )δ α β( − )( − )[ − ( )] − + = +δ αα β δ−−v p c c c c1 1 0 .T u d u d12 1 12 1 1
The comparative statics about the model's parameters are all
intuitive and follow from the observation that the equilibrium
expected loss of quality premium α( − ) [ − ( )]v p1 0T2
δ= ( + )αδ α β
−
( − ) c c /
d u1
2
is decreasing in δ and α, and increasing in β , cd,
and cu. Consumers punish the downstream ﬁrm less for bad per-
formance if the ﬁrms care more about the future (greater δ) or the
public unit-speciﬁc signals of ﬁnal quality are less noisy (greater α
or smaller β) or the efforts are less costly (smaller cd or cu).8
We also need to show that the assumption that the downstream
ﬁrm's promise to punish upstream shirking by reverting to supplier-
speciﬁc low-quality transactions rather than by excluding that
supplier from all future transactions is without loss of generality. On
A.E. Saak / Int. J. Production Economics 177 (2016) 149–162154an out-of-equilibrium path where one supplier (say supplier A)
shirks and the other supplier puts in effort, the expected (per pro-
duct) value of the downstream ﬁrm under inter-ﬁrm punishment
by supplier-speciﬁc reversion to low quality is given by
π ( )=0, 1, 0, 1DT α β[ − ( + ) − ( − )( − ){ − ( )}]δ− v w c v p1 1 0
T d T1
1
1
2
.
Now suppose that in equilibrium the downstream ﬁrm pro-
mises to punish upstream shirking by exclusion. There are two
possibilities. If the value of the downstream ﬁrm on an off-equi-
librium path where it transacts with the remaining non-shirking
supplier is greater than π ( )0, 1, 0, 1DT , then the punishment by
supplier exclusion is not optimal. The reason is that it is easier to
satisfy the DIC constraint when upstream shirking is punished by
inﬁnite supplier-speciﬁc reversion to low quality. If the value of
the downstream ﬁrm that transacts only with the non-shirking
supplier is smaller than π ( )0, 1, 0, 1DT , then the punishment of
upstream shirking by exclusion is not credible. The reason is that
the downstream ﬁrm will prefer to continue to transact with all
suppliers and procure a mix of high and low quality inputs after it
observes than one of the suppliers started shirking.
3.4. No-traceability regime
When upstream efforts are anonymous (unidentiﬁable by
source), the credibility of the downstream ﬁrm's promise to pun-
ish upstream shirking can be harder to sustain. In the no-trace-
ability regime the downstream ﬁrm must punish all suppliers
(that is, offer payments ( ) = ( )w w, 0, 0A B forever or cut all suppliers
off) once it detects that one (or more) of suppliers shirked in the
previous period (see Lemma 1 in Appendix). We refer to this
strategy as “group punishment”. However, instead of punishing all
suppliers the downstream ﬁrm may prefer to (a) punish one of the
suppliers, or (b) punish none of the suppliers. Under strategy (a),
by experimenting with input payments the downstream ﬁrm may
learn the identity of the shirker. Under strategy (b), by offering the
expected payments to all suppliers the downstream ﬁrm can
source a mix of high and low quality inputs without learning the
identity of the shirker. The group punishment incentive compat-
ibility constraint (GPIC) that is derived in Appendix ensures that
the downstream ﬁrm is willing to administer the harshest pun-
ishment when one or both suppliers shirk.
In Lemma 2 in Appendix it is shown that the GPIC constraint is
satisﬁed if and only if
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠δ α β β β β( − )[ ( ) + ( − ) − ( − ) ( )] ≤ ( )p p p c G1 1 2 1 0 , 3
N N N d w
c
1
2
N
d
where δ δ( ) ≡ [ + ( − )( + ) ( + ( − ) )]δ+G s s s smin 1 , 2 1 1 , 1 1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
.
The left-hand side of (3) is the discounted incremental expected
quality premium and the right-hand side is the (averaged out over
time) incremental cost from not immediately punishing both
suppliers. Consider a special case with a sufﬁciently small discount
factor and no type II errors (false negatives) in consumer mon-
itoring of quality ( β = 0). Then the left-hand side becomes
⎛
⎝⎜
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎞
⎠⎟δα − ( )p p 0
N N1
2
and the right-hand side becomes +w cN d. The
GPIC constraint is satisﬁed if, having observed unprompted
shirking, the downstream ﬁrm prefers to save the expected pay-
ments and the cost of downstream efforts for both products,
+w cN d, and earn δ ( )p 0N in the next period rather than to offer the
expected payments to both suppliers and put its own efforts into
both products and earn δ α α( ( ) + ( − ) ( ))p p1 0N N1
2
in the next period.
In contrast, when the future is important, the downstream ﬁrm's
option value of learning the ﬁrst-time shirker's identity is high,
and for δ → 1 the right-hand side of (3) converges to +w cN d1
2
because only a non-shirker can receive the expected payment in
the long run.Proposition 2. (No-traceability) If ⎪
⎪⎧⎨⎩> [α β α− ( − )v cmax max ,
u1 1
2 1
⎪
⎪⎫⎬⎭] [ ] −α β
α
α β
+
− −
−
−c c c c, , max ,
d c c u d d
2
1 2d u , there exists a threshold level of
the discount factor δ < 1N such that for all δ δ≥ N there exists an
equilibrium with trade. The optimal expected input payment, product
price, and the joint proﬁt are given by, respectively, α β δ( )w c c, , , ,N u d ,
α β δ( )p y v c c; , , , , ,N u d and π α β δ( )v c c, , , , ,N u d .
Proof. See Appendix.
The analytical expressions for the input and output price func-
tions and payoffs are provided in Appendix. If δ
δ
{ [ ( ) ]}
[ ( ) ]
2G c c
c c
max / , 1
max / , 1
u d
u d
≥ βα
−
−
1
1
,
the GPIC constraint does not increase the overall incentive costs
(that is, the frequency or magnitude of the price discounts in the
ﬁnal good market) but the expected input payment may increase,
≥w wN T , in order to make abstaining from the punishment of up-
stream shirking more costly. Because the DIC constraint is easier to
satisfy when the downstream ﬁrm cannot vertically coordinate
shirking, the price discount after a bad performance is smaller,
( ) > ( )p p0 0N T . For δ
δ
{ [ ( ) ]}
[ ( ) ]
2G c c
c c
max / , 1
max / , 1
u d
u d
< βα
−
−
1
1
, the GPIC constraint is
binding and the downstream ﬁrm has to offer price discounts more
frequently: ( ) = > ( )p v p1 0.5N N > ( )p 0N (recall that
( ) = ( ) =p p v1 0.5T T > ( )p 0T ). This makes the threat of group punish-
ment incentive compatible as the downstream ﬁrm gives up rela-
tively little incremental expected revenue compared with the large
savings from jointly reneging on all input payments and shirking on
its own downstream efforts. To understand condition
≥ ( < )δ
δ
{ [ ( ) ]}
[ ( ) ]
2G c c
c c
max / , 1
max / , 1
u d
u d
β
α
−
−
1
1
, note that the left-hand side is the ratio
of the incremental costs averaged out over time that the down-
stream ﬁrm incurs under the most proﬁtable deviation from the
group punishment strategy, δ( [ { } ])c G c cmax / , 1d u d , and the greater
of the upstream and downstream per product cost savings from
single-unit shirking, δ[ ]c cmax / ,u d1
2
, when upstream suppliers are
just indifferent between working and shirking. The right-hand side
is a measure of the informativeness of public signals (a likelihood
ratio).
As in the traceability regime, the punishment of upstream
shirking by cutting suppliers off is not optimal. Since the shirker's
identity is not known, we can restrict our attention to punish-
ments by exclusion of all suppliers in which case the downstream
ﬁrm exits the market for high quality products and earns the re-
servation payoff of zero. Because selling either uniformly low
quality products or a mix of high and low quality products without
disclosing upstream shirking generates a greater payoff, the
downstream ﬁrm cannot credibly promise to punish upstream
shirking by excluding both suppliers from all future transactions.4. Traceability versus no traceability
We are now in a position to compare the equilibrium proﬁts in
the traceability and no-traceability regimes. It will be convenient
to set α β= − ∈ ( )1 , 11
2
and refer to α as the precision of consumer
information, and let
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟δ( ) ≡ + δδ δ
| − |
( [ ]) − [ ]
−
R x, 1 x
G x x
/ 1
2 max / , 1 min / , 1
1
.
Proposition 3. Suppose that v is sufﬁciently large. The equilibrium
expected joint proﬁt is greater (smaller) in the no-traceability regime
than in the traceability regime, π ≤T π( > ) N , depending on whether
α δ≤ ( > ) ( )R x, , where function δ( )R x, is unimodal in x, reaches its
maximal value of 1 at δ=x , and
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Fig. 1. The value of traceability for different combinations of the values of the ratio
of upstream and downstream costs, x ( = )c c/u d , and the precision of consumer
information, α .
A.E. Saak / Int. J. Production Economics 177 (2016) 149–162 155Proof. See Appendix.
If consumer monitoring of efforts is sufﬁciently noisy, in-
formation about input origin decreases proﬁts because maintaining
the credibility of the promise to abstain from vertically co-
ordinated provision of low and high quality products imposes
relatively large incentive costs. If consumers monitor efforts with
little noise, information about input origin increases proﬁts be-
cause it is difﬁcult to make the promise to punish all suppliers for
occasional shirking self-enforcing.
The general shape of function δ( )R x; in Fig. 1 illustrates com-
parative statics about the ratio of the costs of upstream and down-
stream efforts, ( = )x c c/u d , the precision of consumer information, α,
and the discount factor, δ . The value of information about input
origin, π π−T N , decreases if the ratio of upstream and downstream
costs of efforts is closer to δ ( δ| − |c c/u d is smaller) or consumer in-
formation is less precise ( α is smaller). Furthermore, the value of
information about input origin is negative at δ=c c/u d for any value
of α. In that case, only reneging on the expected payment or only
shirking on the downstream effort is half as proﬁtable for the
downstream ﬁrm as vertically coordinated shirking. This makes the
inability to engage in vertically coordinated shirking so valuable that
the no-traceability regime dominates even if consumer information is
very precise. Function R is asymmetric in x around δ because the
downstream ﬁrm may be able to slacken the GPIC constraint by in-
creasing the expected input payment wN for δ<x , whereas doing so
cannot be optimal for δ>x .
As Fig. 1 demonstrates, the effect of δ on the value of trace-
ability, π π−T N , is ambiguous because δ affects the importance of
future payoffs for both the downstream ﬁrm and upstream ﬁrms.
On the one hand, it is easier for a more patient downstream ﬁrm to
satisfy the DIC constraint (not to shirk) and more difﬁcult to satisfy
the GPIC constraint (to punish shirkers). On the other hand, the
minimum input payment that satisﬁes the UIC constraint, δ c
u1 ,
decreases in δ . This magniﬁes the reduction in the incentive cost
due to the inability to vertically coordinate shirking if the down-
stream ﬁrm's most proﬁtable deviation in the regime without
traceability is to shirk on all efforts and contracts.5. Extensions and robustness checks
5.1. Multiple suppliers
We now examine the value of traceability in a model with more
than two suppliers. In the regime with perfect traceability,Proposition 1 easily extends to the case with ≥n 2 suppliers. In
equilibrium the most proﬁtable deviation for the downstream ﬁrm is
to vertically coordinate shirking for a single unit. The optimal input
price does not change, the price policy again prescribes a discount,
δ
δ α β α
+
( − )( − ) −
c c
n
/
1
u d
n 1, only if consumers observe =y 0, and the per product
joint proﬁt is given by
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥π α= − − − ( − )δ
δ
δ α β−
+
( − )v c c 1
T u d c c
n
1
1
/u d . The
proﬁt is increasing in n since the average public signal becomes less
noisy as n increases.
To study the effects of traceability, we assume that it is always
possible to identify that a given unit originated from a pair of
suppliers but the exact identity of the supplier of origin is un-
known unless there is a traceability system in place. Thus, as in the
no-traceability regime in the two-supplier case, the downstream
ﬁrm cannot perfectly vertically coordinate upstream and down-
stream shirking since it cannot tell whether a given unit originates
from a shirking or non-shirking supplier unless many suppliers
shirk. This inability to engage in the most proﬁtable deviations
allows the downstream ﬁrm to decrease the incentive cost of
maintaining good reputation in the downstream market compared
with that in the regime with perfect traceability. Yet, maintaining
the credibility of inter-ﬁrm punishment for shirking is relatively
easy since the downstream ﬁrm needs to punish just one innocent
supplier in order to punish the actual shirker.
Proposition 4. Perfect traceability is not optimal in a supply chain
with >n 2 suppliers if βα
−
−
1
1
δ δ≤ ( [ ]) ( + [ ])G c c c c2 / / 1 /u d u d .
Proof. See Appendix.
The sufﬁcient condition in Proposition 4 is independent of n
and is satisﬁed whenever (a) ﬁrms are sufﬁciently patient,
(b) consumer information is sufﬁciently noisy, and (c) the ratio of
upstream and downstream costs of effort is sufﬁciently small.
5.2. Turnover among suppliers
Here we discuss what happens if the downstream ﬁrm can
replace suppliers. This tends to make it easier to maintain the
credibility of the threat to punish upstream shirking because the
downstream ﬁrm no longer foregoes future proﬁts when it ex-
cludes a current supplier from future transactions. If the down-
stream ﬁrm can establish proﬁtable relationships with new sup-
pliers, it can cut off the existing suppliers without the loss of sales
in the ﬁnal good market. In the presence of the possibility of
turnover among suppliers the cost of ensuring incentive compat-
ibility of punishing upstream shirking will be proportional to the
cost of replacing a supplier (rather than the cost savings from
shirking on quality as in the case with a ﬁxed supplier base).
Therefore, in a model where the downstream ﬁrm can cut off
shirkers and start transacting with new suppliers, the downstream
ﬁrm is more likely to achieve greater proﬁts in the no-traceability
regime. The reason is that the downstream ﬁrm's ability to engage
in vertically coordinated deviations will not be affected by the
turnover among suppliers, but the incentive cost necessary to
sustain credibility of the promise to punish upstream shirking by
supplier exclusion will be bounded by the cost of changing
suppliers.
5.3. Upstream contracts with transfers contingent on signals of ﬁnal
quality
So far we have assumed that upstream contracts specify a ﬁxed
input price. Whether it can be proﬁtable for the downstream ﬁrm to
offer suppliers contracts with transfers contingent on the non-veriﬁ-
able public signals of ﬁnal quality (subjective consumer experience)
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ability regime, each supplier gets the smallest possible on-going in-
formation rent because the input payment is contingent on the perfect
signal of upstream effort (intermediate quality, qi
u). As a result, the
downstream ﬁrm cannot achieve higher proﬁts by offering suppliers
an implicit contract with transfers contingent on a noisy signal of ﬁnal
quality or output price. This is not necessarily true in the no-trace-
ability regime. If the GPIC constraint does not bind, the downstream
ﬁrm again cannot increase proﬁts by offering contracts with transfers
contingent on the signals of ﬁnal quality. However, if the GPIC con-
straint is hard to satisfy, it may be optimal for the downstream ﬁrm to
ignore its private information about upstream efforts and use only
public signals to adjust the payments to upstream ﬁrms. In that case,
compensation for upstream ﬁrms that is contingent on the perfor-
mance in the downstream market will tend to expand the set of
parameter values such that the no-traceability regime is optimal.
5.4. Imperfect inter-ﬁrm monitoring of upstream efforts
We now consider an extension of the basic model where the
downstream ﬁrm does not observe the actual input quality qi
u but
observes imperfect signals of input quality/upstream efforts,
∈ { }y 0, 1i
u , that are i.i.d. draws from the following distribution:
( = |( ) ∈ {( ) ( )}) = ( )−y q qPr 1 , 1, 1 , 1, 0 1, 4i
u
i
u
i
u
λ( = |( ) = ( )) = − ∈ ( )−y q qPr 1 , 0, 1 1 0, 1 ,i
u
i
u
i
u
( = |( ) = ( )) =y q qPr 1 , 0, 0 0.i
u u u
1 2
Now the downstream ﬁrm detects unilateral upstream shirking
with a ﬁxed exogenous probability λ. The downstream ﬁrm observes
without noise if both suppliers put in efforts or shirk. The former as-
sumption assures that there is no need for the downstream ﬁrm to
actually punish suppliers on the equilibrium path. The latter as-
sumption assures that in the no-traceability regime the downstream
ﬁrm can learn the identity of an unprompted upstream shirker
through one-time experimentation with input payment offers. We
impose an additional assumption that ( )y y e e, , ,u u d d1 2 1 2 is a sufﬁcient
statistic for the pair ( )y y,1 2 with respect to q q,
u u
1 2 in order to ensure
that the signals of ﬁnal quality cannot be used to make inferences
about input quality/upstream efforts, and that β α λ= ( − )1 .9
As before, we assume that in the traceability regime upon ob-
serving =y 0i
u for the ﬁrst time the downstream ﬁrm believes that
supplier oi will never put in efforts in the future. In the no-tra-
ceability regime, upon observing ( ) ∈ {( ) ( )}y y, 0, 1 , 1, 0u u1 2 or
( ) = ( )y y, 0, 0u u1 2 for the ﬁrst time, the downstream ﬁrm believes
that one or, respectively, both suppliers will never put in efforts in
the future. In that case, the approach that was used to characterize
equilibrium under perfect downstream monitoring of upstream
efforts, λ = 1, remains valid for λ < 1. The upstream incentive
compatibility constraint is now given by
π λ δπ≥ + ( − ) ∈ { } ∈ { }⋅ ( )w j A B k N T1 , , , , UIC'jk k jk
The right-hand side is the upstream ﬁrm's payoff from choos-
ing a low level of effort, where with probability λ−1 the down-
stream ﬁrm does not detect unilateral upstream shirking and with
probability λ upstream shirking is detected and punished by zero9 A garbling process of inter-ﬁrm signals of upstream and downstream efforts
that satisﬁes these conditions is given by ε η= + ( − [ ])y y e e e e1 max ,i i
u
i
d
i i
d
A
u
B
u
i,
=i 1, 2, where ε η ∈ { }, 0, 1i i are noise terms that are independent across products
and across periods, ε α( = ) = ∈ ( )Pr 1 0, 1i and η( = )Pr 1i α λ= ( − )1 .payments in the future. Upon simpliﬁcation, the upstream in-
centive compatibility constraint becomes
λ≥ = ( )λ δδλ δ
− ( − )w c x c ,k u d1 1 1
where λ( ) = ≥λ δλ
− ( − )x c
c
c
c
1 1 u
d
u
d is decreasing in λ. Since none of the
other participation and incentive compatibility constraints change,
in order to characterize equilibrium under imperfect inter-ﬁrm
monitoring of upstream efforts we just need to replace ( = ( ))x x 1
with λ( )x in Propositions 1 and 2. An increase in the precision of
inter-ﬁrm monitoring, λ, raises the joint proﬁts in both regimes.
This happens because (i) the signals of output quality become
more informative since low quality products are relatively less
likely to generate good signals, and (ii) the expected input pay-
ment (weakly) decreases since the upstream shirking is less likely
to go undetected by the downstream ﬁrm.
Comparing the joint proﬁts in the regimes with and without
traceability, we ﬁnd that the downstream ﬁrm prefers the no-
traceability regime or traceability regime depending on whether
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
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1
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1
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1
Because the right-hand side is decreasing in λ, it follows that the
downstream ﬁrm tends to prefer the no-traceability regime as the
likelihood of detecting upstream shirking decreases. A smaller rate at
which the downstream ﬁrm detects upstream shirking and con-
sumers observe bad signals when the true quality is low has two ef-
fects on the difference in the overall incentive costs in the regime with
and without traceability. First, as λ decreases, the equilibrium input
payment (weakly) increases. This has a positive or negative effect on
the value of information about input origin depending on whether
λ( ) < ( ≥ ) δx
c
c
1 u
d , that is, whether the full costs of upstream and
downstream efforts become more similar or dissimilar as λ decreases.
Second, a smaller λ also reduces the downstream ﬁrm's temptation to
condone unilateral upstream shirking in the no-traceability regime
since the signals of ﬁnal quality generated by products of uniformly
low quality and those generated by products of mixed (high and low)
quality are more likely to be similar. As the precision of inter-ﬁrm
monitoring decreases, the temptation to condone anonymous up-
stream shirking becomes weaker than the temptation to vertically
coordinate shirking and, as a result, the value of information about
input origin decreases.
5.5. Vertically substitutable efforts
Some downstream efforts such as investing in irradiation and
pasteurization (so called “kill steps”) can substitute for upstream
efforts to produce high quality products. Consider the case with
perfectly substitutable upstream and downstream efforts where
ﬁnal quality is given by
= [ ] ( )q q emax , . 5i i
u
i
d
If the “downstream mitigation” effort is cheaper, ≤c wd , the
downstream ﬁrm prefers to source low quality inputs and mi-
tigate upstream defects by putting in its own efforts,
( ) = ( )e e e e, , , 0, 0, 1, 1Au Bu d d1 2 . If the “upstream prevention” effort is
cheaper, >c wd , the downstream ﬁrm prefers to source high
quality inputs and save the costs of downstream efforts,
( ) = ( )e e e e, , , 1, 1, 0, 0Au Bu d d1 2 . Unlike in the case with com-
plementary upstream and downstream efforts, there is no scope
for vertically coordinated shirking since in equilibrium either
only suppliers put in efforts (prevention of quality defects) or
only the downstream ﬁrm puts in efforts (mitigation of quality
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ticated deviations in the traceability regime, traceability is al-
ways optimal (if the direct cost of the traceability system is
sufﬁciently small).6. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed a model of a supply chain with
imperfect information about product quality and origin. We fo-
cused on the effects of traceability on the incentive costs necessary
to build reputation for high quality and demonstrated that de-
tailed information about product ﬂows can decrease proﬁts even
without taking into account the direct cost of traceability. One
implication is that there are circumstances when mandatory tra-
ceability can decrease social welfare. This happens if the down-
stream ﬁrm can build a reputation for high quality in the no-tra-
ceability regime but not in the traceability regime, or if the
downstream ﬁrm prefers to exit the market for high quality be-
cause of the negative effects of traceability on proﬁts.
Our analysis can be extended in several dimensions. To focus on
the decision to adopt a traceability system, we studied a setting
with binary efforts. Allowing for continuous efforts to provide
quality may lead to an interesting trade-off between the costs of
building reputation and the levels of upstream and downstream
efforts implementable in equilibrium in different traceability re-
gimes. Second, in order to provide a clean characterization of the
conditions under which information about product ﬂow reduces
proﬁts, we made several simplifying assumptions about the
structure of information regarding upstream and downstream ef-
forts, and it is of interest to extend the analysis to more general
settings. Third, we have not considered the effects of negative
externalities created by low quality products as in the case of
unsafe food that can contaminate other products or adversely af-
fect other people through poor hand washing or by other means.
Also, we assumed that the downstream ﬁrm and consumers
cannot obtain additional information about effort choices along the
supply chain. In practice, ﬁrms and consumers can monitor com-
pliance with quality standards through audits and inspections by
external monitors. On the one hand, external monitoring of efforts
should decrease the value of traceability since the downstream ﬁrm
will have more tools to punish upstream shirking. This happens, if in
addition to the exclusion of suspected shirkers or the reversion to the
provision of low quality, the downstream ﬁrm can identify and
punish shirkers by increasing the intensity of audits. On the other
hand, traceability can increase the effectiveness of audits and reduce
the costs of providing inter-ﬁrm incentives to provide high quality.
Investigating whether additional external means of identifying non-
complying suppliers increase or decrease the beneﬁts of adopting a
traceability system is left for future research.AppendixLemma 1. In the no-traceability regime, if there exists an equili-
brium in which all ﬁrms exert efforts in every period, then upstream
shirking by one or more suppliers is punished by reversion to the
static equilibria of the contracting subgame where either (i) the
downstream ﬁrm offers a payment that just covers the cost of low
quality inputs to all suppliers and suppliers produce low quality in-
puts forever or (ii) the downstream ﬁrm stops transacting with allsuppliers and exits the market.
Proof of Lemma 1 If suppliers are willing to put in efforts, it must
be that their payoffs depend on input quality. Suppose that the
downstream ﬁrm announces the following strategy of punishing
unprompted upstream shirking: With probability ϕ ∈ ( ]0, 1 , pun-
ish a randomly chosen supplier (by offering him a contract =w 0
in the future) and continue to offer the expected payment wN to
the other supplier; with probability ϕ−1 , punish all suppliers if
one of them shirks; and with probability one, punish all suppliers
if all suppliers shirk. Then, provided that the upstream incentive
compatibility (UIC) constraint is satisﬁed, the best response for a
supplier that was offered the expected input payment in every
period and shirked in period t for the ﬁrst time is the following
“stop shirking if not punished” strategy: Exert effort in every per-
iod >z t if the downstream ﬁrm offers the expected payment;
shirk in every period >z t if the downstream ﬁrm offers a smaller-
than-expected payment. Having done the same calculation, the
downstream ﬁrm will prefer to continue to offer the expected
payments to all suppliers in period +t 1 after it observes low input
quality ( ) ∈ {( ) ( ) ( )}q q, 0, 0 , 0, 1 , 1, 0t
u
t
u
1, 2, for the ﬁrst time in period
t . The reason is that both the supplier that shirked in period t and
the supplier that did not shirk prefer to be on the equilibrium path
in period +t 1 if the downstream offers the expected payment wN
in period +t 1. This demonstrates that in the no-traceability re-
gime, the downstream ﬁrm's threat to punish a randomly chosen
subset of suppliers, whether or not it includes the one that actually
shirked, is not credible for any ϕ > 0. If ϕ = 0, provided that the
group punishment incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed,
the downstream ﬁrm's threat of group punishment is self-enfor-
cing because each supplier expects to be offered a zero payment
forever (or being excluded from all future transactions) after
shirking for the ﬁrst time and has no reasons to put in efforts after
destroying the group's reputation for high input quality.□
Derivation of the group punishment incentive compatibility
(GPIC) constraint
Suppose that the downstream ﬁrm observes ( )q q,u u1 2 =( )0, 1 for
the ﬁrst time in period t but does not know whether the input
originated from A or B, and let
( ) = ( ) + ( ) ( )P e e P e e P e e, , , 0, 1, , 1, 0, , A1N d d N d d N d d12 12 1 2 12 1 2 12 1 2
denote the expected price when the downstream ﬁrm does not
know the identity of the shirker.
For concreteness, we assume that unit 1 is supplied by supplier A.
First, suppose that the downstream offers ( )w w,A B ∈{( )w0, N ,( )}w , 0N .
In that case, from observing ( ) ∈ {( ) ( )}q q, 0, 1 , 1, 0u u1 2 in period +t 1
the downstream infers that it offered the input price of zero to the
shirker while it offered wN to the supplier that did not shirk in
period t . From observing ( ) = ( )q q, 0, 0t
u
t
u
1, 2, , the inference is that w
N
was offered to the supplier that shirked in period t and 0 was offered
to the supplier that did not shirk in period t . Therefore, by offering
( ) = ( )w w w, 0,A t B t N, , , the downstream ﬁrm punishes the actual
shirker and earns
( ) δπ− − ( + ) + ( ) ( )P w e e c e e, , 1, 1 0, 1, , . A2N N d d d DN d d12 12 12 12 1 2 1 2
By offering ( ) = ( )w w w, , 0A t B t N, , , the downstream ﬁrm reneges
on the expected payment to a non-shirking supplier and earns
( ) δπ− − ( + ) + ( ) ( )P w e e c e e, , 1, 1 0, 0, , . A3N N d d d DN d d12 12 12 12 1 2 1 2
Combining the two possibilities, the downstream ﬁrm punishes
the actual shirker with probability 1
2
, and the maximum expected
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⎛
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⎤
⎦
⎥⎥ ( )
δ π
π
− − ( + ) + ( )
+ ( )
∈{ }
A4
P w e e c e e
e e
max , , 1, 1 0, 0, ,
0, 1, , .
ed ed
N N d d d
D
N d d
D
N d d
1 , 2 0,1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2 1 2
1
2 1 2
1
2 1 2
If the downstream offers the expected payments to both the
shirker and non-shirker, it does not learn the identity of the
shirker, and its maximum payoff is given by
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
δπ
− − ( + )
+ ( )⋅ ( )
∈{ }
P w e e c
e e
max , , 1, 1
, , , A5
e e
N N d d d
D
N d d
, 0,1
1
2
1
2
1
2 1 2
1
2
1
2 1 2
d d
1 2
Finally, if the downstream ﬁrm offers both suppliers the input
payments that just cover the cost of producing low quality inputs,
it earns at most
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟ δπ− ( + ) + ( )⋅
( )∈{ }
P e e c e emax , , 1, 1 0, 0, ,
A6e e
N d d d
D
N d d
, 0,1
1
2
1
2
1
2 1 2 1 2d d
1 2
Therefore, the maximum expected payoff for the downstream
ﬁrm after it observed ( )q q,u u1 2 =( )0, 1 for the ﬁrst time in the pre-
vious period satisﬁes the following value recursive equation
⎛
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⎞
⎠
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π
δπ
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w e e c e e
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D
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⎟⎟⎟ δπ˜ ˜ − ( + ) + ( ) ⋅ ( )∈{ }
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The downstream ﬁrm is willing to offer ( ) = ( )w w, 0, 0A B after
observing a single instance of upstream shirking if the group
punishment incentive compatibility (GPIC) constraint is satisﬁed:
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟δπ π+ ( ) ≥P , , 1, 1 0, 0, 0, 0 , , 1, 1 .
N
D
N
D
N1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
(GPIC)
Finally, note that the threat to punish both upstream ﬁrms after
the downstream ﬁrm observes ( )q q,u u1, 2 =( )0, 0 for the ﬁrst time is
credible because, as in the traceability regime, there is no un-
certainty regarding the identities of upstream shirkers.
Lemma 2. The GPIC constraint is satisﬁed if and only if condition (3)
is satisﬁed.
Proof of Lemma 2 Rewriting (A7) in a more explicit form yields
⎡⎣⎢
⎛
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2 1where the right-hand side is the maximum expected payoff
from all possibly optimal combinations of pairs of input payments
and downstream efforts. Upon substituting (A1) and (A8) into the
GPIC constraint and simpliﬁcation, it reduces to the following
system of inequalities:
δ+ ≥ ( ( ) − ( ))w c P P0, 1, 11 0, 0, 0, 0 ,N d N N
δ+ ≥ ( ( ) − )( )w c P P0, 1, 01 0, 0, 0, 0 ,N d N N1
2
( )( )δ δ− + ≥ ( ( ) − ( ))w c P P1 0, 1, 1, 1 0, 0, 0, 0 ,N d N N12 12 12
( )( )δ δ− + ≥ ( ( ) − ( )w c P P1 0, 1, 0, 1 0, 0, 0, 0 ,N d N N12 12 12 12
( ) ( )
( )
δ δ
δ δ δ
δ δ δ
δ
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≥ (( − ) ( ) + ( ) − ( ))
− + ≥ (( − ) ( )
+ ( ) − ( ))
w c
P P P
w c P
P P
1 1
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Upon substituting the formulas for the expected prices condi-
tional on effort proﬁle, ( )P 0, 0, 0, 0N , ( )P 0, 1, 0, 1N , and
( )P 0, 1, 1, 1N , this system of inequalities reduces to condition (3).□
Proof of Proposition 1. The upstream ﬁrm's incentive compat-
ibility (UIC) constraint,
δπ− + ≥w c w,u j
can be rewritten as
δπ ≥ c ,j u
or
≥ ( )δw c . A9
u1
Note that the UIC constraint implies the on-going upstream
ﬁrm's participation (UP) constraint.
The downstream ﬁrm's incentive compatibility (DIC) constraint
can be rewritten as
α α α α− − + ( ( ) + ( − ) ( ) + ( − ) ( )
− − ) ( )
δ
δ−p w c p p p
w c
1 2 1 0.5 1 0
A10
d
d
1
2 2
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⎤
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δ
δ
αβ
α β α β
α β
β β β β
> + − − +
−
( )
+ [ ( − ) + ( − ) ] ( )
+ ( − )( − ) ( ) − −
{ ( ) + ( − ) ( ) + ( − ) ( )}δ δ−
p w c p
p
p w c
p p p
max
1
2
1
2 1
1
1 1 0.5
1 1 0
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2
,
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d
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2 2
The left-hand side is the downstream ﬁrm's equilibrium payoff
when consumers are willing to pay up to p. The right-hand side is
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stationary deviations. Given that the quality of the ﬁnal product
exhibits the “weakest-link” property, the downstream ﬁrm prefers
to vertically coordinate upstream and downstream shirking rather
than (a) renege on the upstream payment to a supplier and put in
its own effort into the product originating from that supplier, or
(b) shirk on the downstream effort for one product and offer the
expected payments for the input used in that product. Therefore,
we only need to verify that the downstream ﬁrm does not prefer
to vertically coordinate shirking for one unit or provide two low
quality units.
Therefore, the equilibrium can be recovered by solving the
following proﬁt-maximization problem
( )α α α α[ ( ) + ( − ) ( ) + ( − ) ( ) − − ]δ( ) ( ) ( ) − A11p p p c cmax 1 2 1 0.5 1 0w p p p
d u
, 0 , 0.5 , 1
1
1
2 2
subject to (A9), (A10), and ( ) ( ) ( ) ∈ [ ]p p p v0 , 0.5 , 1 0, . Consider the
following simpler problem where we only require that the
downstream ﬁrm does not prefer to coordinate shirking for one of
the units:
α
α α α
[ ( )
+ ( − ) ( ) + ( − ) ( ) − − ] ( )
δ( ) ( ) ( )∈[ ] −
p
p p c c
max 1
2 1 0.5 1 0 A12
w p p p v
d u
, 0 , 0.5 , 1 0,
1
1
2
2
subject to δ α β α α α( − )[ ( ) + ( − ) ( ) − ( − ) ( )]− [ +p p p w1 1 2 0.5 1 0 1
2
] ≥c 0d and (A9). Clearly, both constraints are binding at optimum,
and substituting the binding constraints the problem becomes
⎡
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Hence, the optimal solution to (A12) is
( ) = ( ) =p p v1 0.5 ,
⎡
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⎤
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v
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1
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u d
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1
2
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2
and
= δw c .
u1
To show that (A14) is the solution to the original problem (A11)
we demonstrate that the constraint that ensures that the down-
stream ﬁrm does not prefer to shirk on all efforts and contracts:
( )α α α α− − + { ( ) + ( − ) ( ) + ( − ) ( ) − − }δ δ− A15p w c p p p w c1 2 1 0.5 1 0
d d
1
2 2
≥ β β β β+ { ( ) + ( − ) ( ) + ( − ) ( )}]δ δ−p p p p1 2 1 0.5 1 0 ,1
2 2
is satisﬁed. Constraint (A15) can be rewritten as
δ α β α β β α α β( − ){( + ) ( ) + [ − − ] ( ) − ( − − ) ( )}
− − ≥ ( )
p p p
w c
1 2 1 0.5 2 0
0 A16d
Substituting (A14) into (A16) yields
δ α β α β δ
δ α α β
δ( − )( − − ) +
( − )( − )
− − ≥c c c c2 /
1
/ 0,
u d
u d1
2
or
α β− ≥ 0.
This demonstrates that in equilibrium the expected inputpayment and product-pricing scheme are given by = δw c
T u1 ,
( ) = − δδ α β α
+
( − )( − )p v0
T c c /
2 1
d u
, ( ) = ( ) =p p v0.5 1T T , where the output pri-
ces are non-negative if α β α δ δ( − )( − ) − − ≥v c c2 1 0d u2 . Let
δ ≡ <α β αα β α
+ ( ) + ( − )( − )
( − )( − ) 1
T c c vc
v
8 1
4 1
d d u2
denote the largest root of this
quadratic equation assuming that condition > α β α
+
( − )( − )v
c c
2 1
d u
is
satisﬁed.□
Proof of Proposition 2. In the no-traceability regime, the DIC
constraint can be written more explicitly as
( )δ α α α α− − + ( ( ) + ( − ) ( ) + ( − ) ( ) − − ) A17p w c p p p w c1 2 1 0.5 1 0d d2 2
⎡⎣ (
)
αβ α β α β
α β
≥ − − + ( ( ) + ( − ) + ( − ) ) ( )
+ ( − )( − ) ( ) − −
δ
δ−p w c p p
p w c
max 1 1 1 0.5
1 1 0 ,
d
d
1
2 1
1
2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
αβ α β α β α
β
− − + ( ( ) + ( ( − ) + ( − ) ) ( ) + ( − )
− ) ( ) − −
δ
δ−p w c p p
p w c
1 1 1 0.5 1
1 0 ,
d
d
1
2 1
1
2β α β α β β α β− − + ( ( + ) ( ) + (( + )( − ) + ( − ) )
( )
δ
δ−p w c p
p
1 2 1 1
0.5
d1
2
1
2 1
1
2
-β α β+( − )( − − )p1 2 − − )w c ,d
⎤⎦⎧⎨⎩
⎫⎬⎭β β β β+ ( ) + ( − ) ( ) + ( − ) ( )
δ
δ−p p p p1 2 1 0.5 1 0 .1
2 2
When the downstream ﬁrm cannot vertically coordinate up-
stream and downstream effort choices, it is possible that the
downstream ﬁrm's most proﬁtable deviation is to renege on the
payment for upstream effort for one of the ﬁrms (or shirk on the
downstream effort for one of the products) but continue to put
downstream efforts into both products (respectively, offer the
expected payments to both upstream ﬁrms). Upon some manip-
ulation, (A17) reduces to the following system of inequalities:
( )δ α β α α α[ ] ≤ ( − )[ ( ) + ( − ) ( ) − ( − ) ( )] A18ac w p p pmax , 1 1 2 0.5 1 0 ,d12
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Thus, applying Lemma 2, the proﬁt-maximization problem can
be restated as
( )α α α α[ ( ) + ( − ) ( ) + ( − ) ( ) − − ]δ( ) ( ) ( )∈[ ] − A19p p p c cmax 1 2 1 0.5 1 0w p p p v
u d
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2 2
subject to (A9), (A18), and (3). There are two cases to consider
depending on whether constraint (3) is binding at optimum.
Suppose that at optimum constraint (3) does not bind. Then from
conditions (A18a), (A18b), and (A18c) it follows that the optimal
solution is
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stream and downstream shirking cannot be optimal (that is, there
are other deviations that are more proﬁtable). Substituting the
optimal price policy in (A20) it follows that condition (3) is sa-
tisﬁed if
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Condition (A21) can be equivalently rewritten as
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Therefore, condition (3) is satisﬁed if
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Substituting (A20) the greatest achievable joint proﬁt is given
by
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Because the payoff in (A23) is decreasing in or independent of
w depending on whether ≥w ⎡⎣⎢
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, and the left-
hand side of (A22) is increasing in w for all <w cd, the GPIC
constraint is not binding if
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in which case an optimal expected payment is any
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the GPIC constraint (that is, condition (3)) is binding at optimum,
which implies that the optimal price policy satisﬁes the following
equations:⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟β β( ) = ( ) = + ( − ) ( ) − ( )β δ α β− ( − )p v and p v p c G1 0 1 2 0.5 . A26
d w
c
1
1
1
d
From substitution of (A26) into the downstream ﬁrm's in-
centive compatibility constraints (A18) it follows that the greatest
( )p 0.5 that satisﬁes all constraints is given by
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Substituting the price policy deﬁned by (A26) and (A27), the
expected joint proﬁt becomes
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Now it only remains to ﬁnd an optimal input price that satisﬁes
the UIC constraint (A9). Suppose that >w cd. Then the expected
joint per product proﬁt in (A28) is decreasing in w because
α( − )1 ( )G w
cd
α β− ( + − )1 2 w
c
1
2 d
is decreasing in w when condition
(A25) holds (function G is piecewise differentiable). Therefore, it
must be that at optimum, either ≤w cd if <δ c c
u d1 or = δw c
u1 if
≥δ c c
u d1 . If δ≥c
c
u
d
, the upstream ﬁrm's no-shirking constraint binds
at optimum, and the optimal expected payment to each upstream
ﬁrm (and upstream ﬁrm's value) is given by = δw c
u1 . When the
ratio of the costs of upstream and downstream efforts is greater
than the discount factor, increasing the expected payment to up-
stream ﬁrms cannot reduce the overall incentive costs for the
downstream ﬁrm.
The remaining possibility that needs to be considered is that
at optimum, < ≤δ c w c
u d1 . Then the expected joint per product
proﬁt in (A28) is increasing in w because function G is increasing
in w. Therefore, the optimal expected payment to upstream
ﬁrms is =w cd. Summarizing, the expected joint proﬁt cannot
exceed
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if condition (A25) holds.
The output prices are non-negative for sufﬁciently large
discount factors, ⎡⎣⎢δ δ∈ ), 1
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input payment and output-pricing schemes, and joint payoff are
given by, respectively,
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Proof of Proposition 3. From Propositions 1 and 2, it follows that
the difference between the equilibrium expected joint proﬁts in
the traceability and no-traceability regime is given by
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For β α= −1 , this condition becomes α δ≤ ( > ) ( )R x, . Function
δ( )R x, is unimodal in because it is increasing for δ<x , decreasing
for δ>x , reaches its maximum value of 1 at δ=x , and
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Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that the downstream ﬁrm can
contract with >n 2 identical suppliers and produce at most n
units. Let { }A A A, , ... , n1 2 be the set of suppliers. In a working paper
we show that in the model with n suppliers in the complete tra-
ceability regime in equilibrium with trade the optimal input and
output price policies are given by = δw c
T u1 , ( )=p 0T
− δ
δ α β α
+
( − )( − ) −
v c c
n
/
1
u d
n 1 , ( ) =p y v
T for
⎧⎨⎩
⎫⎬⎭∈y , ... , 1n
1 (Proposition 1 is a
special case with =n 2).
Next we determine under what conditions the input and out-
put pricing policies that are optimal in the complete traceability
regime constitute equilibrium in the incomplete traceability re-
gime. Because a lack of traceability cannot expand the room for
potential deviations (that is, cannot allow the downstream ﬁrm to
deviate in ways that it cannot deviate in in the regime with perfect
traceability), the downstream ﬁrm's incentive compatibility (DIC)
constraint is necessarily satisﬁed in the incomplete traceability
regime under the pricing policy ( ) = ( )p y p yN T for =y 0, , ... , 1
n
1 ,and =w wN T .
The downstream ﬁrm's experimentation strategies to identify
shirkers for >n 2 are essentially the same as in the case with two
suppliers. The reason is that the DIC constraints for multi-unit
deviations are not binding under the proposed pricing policies.
Therefore, if an instance of shirking among a pair of suppliers is
detected, the downstream ﬁrm is willing to continue to offer the
expected input payments and supply high quality products origi-
nating from the remaining non-shirking suppliers. From Lemma 2
it follows that the downstream ﬁrm's promise to punish the pair of
suppliers is credible if
⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
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The only difference between (A29) and the GPIC constraint in
(3) is the term α( − ) −1 n 2 on the left-hand side and the term
n
2 on
the right-hand side. Under the pricing policy ( )p yT , the price
premium can be lost only if the ﬁnal qualities of the products from
all non-shirking suppliers turn out to be low, which happens with
probability α( − ) −1 n 2. The per product cost savings from reneging
on the expected input payments and shirking on the downstream
ﬁrm's efforts for the units generated by a pair of suppliers are now
given by ( + )w c
n
d2 since the downstream ﬁrm continues to pro-
vide high quality products originating from the other suppliers.
It is easy to see that in a supply chain with an arbitrary (even)
number of suppliers complete traceability is not optimal if (A30) is
satisﬁed. In that case, the downstream ﬁrm's promise to punish
upstream shirking is credible in the incomplete traceability regime
even under the input and output pricing policies that are optimal
in the complete traceability regime. Since the DIC for a vertically
coordinated deviation for a single unit binds in equilibrium in the
traceability regime, it must be that the supply chain can generate
greater proﬁts in the incomplete traceability regime (where the
downstream ﬁrm cannot vertically coordinate upstream and
downstream shirking for a single unit and m-unit deviations are
easier for consumers to detect, ≥m 2). As a result, the severity of
the punishment for bad performance in the ﬁnal good market can
be reduced, while still maintaining the incentive compatibility of
punishing a pair of suppliers if one member of the pair is caught
shirking. The incentive cost of maintaining credibility of inter-ﬁrm
punishment for shirking is relatively small when the downstream
ﬁrm does not need to break off its supplier relations with all ﬁrms
at once to punish a shirker.□References
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